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              | Date: 1999-11-18 
 
 UK, AT: ENFOPOL Alerts-.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.-
 
 Die dümmsten Passagen zum Thema Krypto-Regelung , von
 den gesetzlich ermächtigten UK-Behörden in die E-
 Commerce Bill hineingedrückt, sind augenscheinlich
 amputiert, in Wirklichkeit nur für einen Gesetzes/zusatz
 aufgeschoben.
 
 Weil dieses UK-Vorhaben RIP heisst  [Regulation of
 Investigatory Powers] findet Caspar Bowden [Foundation for
 Information Policy Research] auf gut britisch das Akronym
 R.I.P viel passender.
 
 Wie im UK werden allüberall die juridischen Bausteine der
 Überwachung separiert und verteilt: auf multilaterale
 Rechtshilfeabkommen, nationale  Gesetze, parallel dazu
 werden relativ moderate neue EU-Richtlinien dazugeflüstertet.
 Obacht: In AT ist eine Modifikations/vorlage schon nexte
 Woche im Parlament.
 
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 SURPRISE BILL TO REGULATE SURVEILLANCE
 
 The big surprise in the Queen's Speech is the REGULATION
 OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS (R.I.P) bill (Home Office
 release appended below). This will update the Interception of
 Communications Act, regulate covert surveillance and use of
 informers, and provide powers to decrypt coded e-mail (in
 ways which are still unclear).
 
 E-COMMS BILL GETS OUT OF JAIL FREE
 
 The controversial Part.III of the Electronic Communications
 Bill has been dropped, but will be recycled in some form in
 the new R.I.P Bill.
 
 Caspar Bowden, director of the Foundation for Information
 Policy Research, said that:
 
 "The e-Minister (Patricia Hewitt) must be congratulated for
 performing a skilful political amputation to save British e-
 commerce. The shortened Bill still threatens unnecessary
 regulation, but at least now can do much less harm."
 
 DECRYPTION POWERS R.I.P ? QUESTIONS REMAIN ON
 HUMAN RIGHTS.
 
 The HO press release offers tantalising hints of new thinking
 on civil liberties. Until today the Home Office had adamantly
 maintained that Part.III of the Bill created no human rights
 issues (see Notes below). The new statement says that the
 bill is needed to "strengthen the regulation of covert
 surveillance and other intrusive investigative techniques used
 by public authorities to meet the requirements of European
 Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)".
 
 Bowden said of the previous proposals, "the glaring flaw was
 reversing the burden of proof on possession of a decryption
 key. If this remains unchanged, this government will find itself
 on the losing side of its own 1998 Human Rights law"
 
 The HO Press release says that for encrypted data, law
 enforcement will get "specific powers to enable them to make
 that data intelligible".
 
 But Bowden continued: "The Home Office press release
 avoids the burden-of-proof issue with ambiguous wording.
 This may indicate either that the policy is in play, or that the
 new RIP bill will turn out to be window-dressing."
 
 "By introducing the Bill, the government acknowledges the
 need for new thinking on interception and encryption. FIPR
 believes that strong human rights safeguards are in the best
 interests of law-enforcement"
 
 Notes for Editors:
 
 1. FIPR is the UK's leading Internet policy think-tank: an
 independent non-profit organisation that studies the
 interaction between information technology and society. It
 does not represent the interests of any trade-group and its
 goal is to identify technical developments with significant
 social impact, commission research into public policy
 alternatives, and promote public understanding and dialogue
 between technologists and policy-makers in the UK and
 Europe. The Board of Trustees and Advisory Council
 (http://www.fipr.org/trac.html) comprise some of the leading
 experts in the UK.
 
 2. FIPR was the first to draw attention to human rights
 problems in the Draft E-Comms Bill with its press release on
 the day of publication (23/7/99
 http://www.fipr.org/ecommpr.html)
 
 3. FIPR and JUSTICE substantiated these concerns in
 October with a Human Rights Audit of the Bill, conducted by
 former law-commissioner Prof.Jack Beatson QC
 (http://www.fipr.org/ecomm99/pr.html)
 
 4. The Home Office denied Human Rights contravention in a
 press statement of 25th October 1999 (appended below)
 
 -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for
 Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax:
 +44(0)171 827 6534
 
 =============== BACKGROUND NOTE
 
 REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL
 
 "A Bill will be introduced to ensure that the interception of
 communications, and the use or other intrusive techniques,
 continues to be regulated for the protection both of the rights
 of Individuals and of society as a whole."
 
 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill would:
 
 . update the law on the interception of communications;
 
 . strengthen the regulation of covert surveillance and other
 intrusive investigative techniques used by public authorities to
 meet the requirements of European Convention on Human
 Rights (ECHR) ;
 
 . provide for lawful access to the means necessary to make
 encrypted data intelligible.
 
 The Bill would put into effect the proposals in the consultation
 paper 'Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom'
 (CM4368). This was published on 22 June 1999.
 
 The Bill would continue strictly to limit the occasions on
 which communications can be intercepted. And it would
 ensure that the same restrictions applied to all
 communications. A change in the law is necessary due to
 the diversification of communications technologies since the
 introduction of the Interception of Communications Act 1985.
 
 The Bill would also strengthen the regulation covert
 surveillance and other intrusive investigative techniques used
 by public authorities. This would extend regulation to cover
 surveillance (not currently regulated by Part III of the Police
 Act 1997) and the use of covert human sources, including the
 use of agents, informants and undercover officers.
 
 The final part of the Bill would provide for lawful access to
 encrypted data. This would put into effect Part III of the draft
 Electronic Communications Bill which was published on 23
 July 1999 (CM4417). Where, for example, law enforcement
 has lawfully acquired encrypted material, the Bill would give
 them specific powers to enable them to make that data
 intelligible.
 
 All three elements of the Bill would regulate techniques which
 are necessary for the protection of society at large but which
 can impact on the privacy of specific individuals. The Bill
 would strike a balance between these aims in accordance
 with our obligations under the European Convention on
 Human Rights.
 
 Press Office. Home Office Tel: 0171 2734610
 
 17 November 1999
 
 ============================================
 =====
 ============================================
 ===== Home Office Comment on FIPR/Justice Press
 Release (http://www.fipr.org/ecomm99/pr.html)
 
 25th Oct 1999
 
 Government believes the Bill as drafted is compatible with ECHR and Stephen Byers published a statement to that effect when the draft Bill was published.
 
 Accusation - self incrimination
 
 The police can already get access to the information (eg via a search warrant or interception warrant) all we are doing is giving them the power to read it.  The proposals do not give law enforcement agencies new powers t
 o obtain evidential material.
 
 Search warrants are not hindered by the fact that a door happens to be locked.  In essence, we are simply providing powers to the police to deal with a new type of, unbreakable, lock.
 
 We do not believe this is in breach of article 6 of ECHR, which includes a privilege against self-incrimination.  The rule against self-incrimination is designed to stop forced confessions which can be unreliable.  There
 is no question of exacting false information on a 'key'.  It either works or it doesn't.
 
 The extraction of the key itself is not incriminating.
 
 What about police powers to take DNA/fingerprints without consent.  If this is not self- incriminating then why is it not reasonable to demand that they produce a password.
 
 Accusation - inadequate safeguards against abuse.
 
 We do not believe this is in breach of article 8 of ECHR.  This article says expressly that "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the la
 w and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, o
 r for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
 
 The Bill proposes an independent Commissioner to oversee the use of the Secretary of State's powers to authorise the issuing of written notices and a Tribunal to hear complaints. For other written notices, an individual w
 ould be able to initiate proceedings under s7 Human Rights Act if he thought Convention Rights had been violated
 
 Accusation - reversal of the burden of proof
 
 The Bill does not reverse the onus of proof.  The point is that
 it will still be for the authorities to prove that an offence has
 been committed for a prosecution to get off the ground.  The
 Bill actually proposes specific defences
 
 
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 published on: 1999-11-18
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